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Abstract: We examine the effect of ASC 820 (formerly known as SFAS 157) on the valuations 
reported by U.S. private equity funds to their investors. In 2008, the FASB implemented ASC 820 to 
achieve more consistent measurement and increased transparency in fair value reporting. This new 
standard clarified the most critical accounting policy for private equity funds, which typically include 
highly illiquid investments. Exploiting a setting where we can observe all cash flows over a fund’s 
lifetime, we show that the interim reported net asset valuations (NAVs) of liquidated private equity 
funds more accurately predict future net distributions to investors following ASC 820 adoption, 
particularly for venture funds. We supplement our findings with a difference-in-difference test and 
numerous robustness checks. Our findings shed light on financial reporting in an opaque industry and 
suggest that enhanced guidance for the implementation of fair value accounting in ASC 820 
improved the information environment in a significant cross-section of the financial markets. 
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Private Equity Valuation Before and After ASC 820 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 We examine the reported valuations of private equity funds during a sample period that 
includes the adoption of ASC 820, Fair Value Measurements (formerly known as SFAS 157). 
Due to diversity and inconsistency in fair value reporting, the FASB implemented ASC 820 in 
2008.1 ASC 820 clarified the definition and measurement of fair values, resulting in a change to 
the most important accounting policy for private equity funds. Yet, we know very little about 
financial reporting in this large and growing sector. Recent SEC inquiries of several private 
equity firms (Lattman 2012; Maremont and Spector 2014) highlight the importance of valuation 
and reporting in the private equity industry. Moreover, according to a recent survey by Preqin, 88 
percent of limited partners consider valuation to be the greatest issue in the private equity 
industry.2 Our focus on reported valuations and fair value measurement by private equity funds 
allows us to capitalize on a setting that differs from other investment classes insomuch as the 
underlying investments are highly illiquid and we can observe all cash flows to and from 
investors over a fund’s lifetime, negating the need for terminal value estimates. 
 Investment in private equity continues to grow, reaching $2.83 trillion in the U.S. in 
2017, according to Preqin. With significant dollars at stake, relevant and reliable financial 
reporting offers private equity investors (i.e., limited partners) the ability to monitor and compare 
fund performance, make asset allocation decisions, and report quarterly performance information 
to their own investors. Moreover, private equity financial reporting has a spillover effect. Under 
the ASC 820 practical expedient, limited partners, including pension funds, mutual funds, and 
                                                 
1 http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum157.shtml 
2 Preqin is a data provider for the alternative assets industry, and our primary data source. Survey results are 
summarized in http://docs.preqin.com/reports/2018-Preqin-Global-Private-Equity-Report-Sample-Pages.pdf 
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endowments, generally incorporate the fair value provided by the fund in their own financial 
statements.3,4 As a result, private equity financial reporting potentially affects the financial 
reporting and asset allocation decisions of private equity funds, limited partners, and their 
investors. 
We focus on fair value accounting at the private equity fund-level and its relation to 
future cash flows for several reasons. Fund-level valuations are used by limited partners when 
making asset allocation decisions and, as mentioned above, they are the reported values that 
limited partners use in their own financial statements. In addition, most limited partners hold 
private equity investments until maturity and thus are most interested in the future cash return.5  
We examine the quarterly net asset valuations (NAVs) reported by private equity funds 
both before and after the adoption of ASC 820. At any given point in a fund’s life, the fund’s 
NAV represents the sum of its cash contributions, or calls, to date less any distributions of 
realized returns to date, plus accounting recognition of unrealized returns made on investments 
within the fund, net of fees. Prior to ASC 820, U.S. GAAP defined fair value as “the amount at 
which an investment could be exchanged in a current transaction between willing parties, other 
than in a forced or liquidation sale” but provided little or no guidance in estimating fair values. 
While industry practice pre-820 focused on estimating fair value using an entry price, ASC 820 
                                                 
3 According to Private Equity International (2015), top private equity investors include Canada Pension Plan 
Investment Board (CPPIB), Washington State Investment Board (WSIB), California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System (CalPERS), Goldman Sachs Asset Management, and Teacher Retirement System of Texas. 
4 ASU 2009-12 amended ASC 820 to allow reporting entities, as a practical expedient, to estimate the fair value of 
investments within the scope of ASU 2009-12 using the net asset value provided to them. Investments within the 
scope of ASU 2009-12 (often referred to as alternative investments) are commonly in the form of limited partnership 
interests and include investments in venture capital, private equity, and hedge funds. 
5 The secondary market for private equity limited partnership interests only comprises about 2-7% of the total supply 
of U.S. and European fund interests for the time period 2001-2013 (Capital Dynamics 2014). 
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provides direction on how private equity funds should fair-value investments in their portfolio 
and requires fair values based on an exit price.6  
Why is the use of fair value accounting important for the private equity industry? 
Because private equity funds are almost entirely comprised of fair-valued financial instruments, 
consistent and reliable fair value measurements facilitate capital allocation. In addition, reports 
of interim performance, specifically the fair-valued NAV, prove extremely important as other 
publicly available benchmarks or indicators of performance are largely unavailable in this 
opaque market. However, the new standard’s market-based approach may prove problematic in 
valuing private equity investments, which are generally highly illiquid with non-transparent 
market prices (which leads to Level 3 estimates under the ASC 820 fair value hierarchy).7 
Indeed, the new standard was met with some skepticism in the private equity industry given the 
difficulties and costs in implementation for investments that are typically highly illiquid 
(Kreutzer 2009; Mendelson 2009; Rossa 2009). 
 Fair value accounting has been examined in other contexts in the accounting literature. 
Several studies explore differences across underlying asset types (Levels 1, 2, and 3) in value 
relevance (Song, Thomas, and Yi 2010; Lawrence, Siriviriyakul, and Sloan 2016), information 
risk (Riedl and Serafeim 2011), and representational faithfulness (Altamuro and Zhang 2013). 
Within the context of private equity, the finance literature has examined private equity 
performance (e.g., Kaplan and Schoar 2005), but few studies explore the reporting of 
                                                 
6 Fair values based on entry price and exit price are not synonymous. Entry price reflects the cost to purchase, or 
enter into, an interest in a private equity fund. Practically speaking, this would (and did) result in limited partners 
valuing investments at their cost to enter into the fund, or at the price of the latest round of financing (i.e., the cost 
for others to enter into the fund). Exit price refers to the amount the limited partner would receive should it sell (or 
exit) its investment in the private equity fund.  
7 For example, a private equity fund might need to provide a valuation estimate of an investment in Uber or SpaceX. 
Under ASC 820, the fair value hierarchy includes three levels. Level 1 valuations are based on observable, 
independent market data and Level 2 on observable prices from similar markets. Level 3 valuations are based on 
unobservable data such as a pricing model or a proprietary financial forecast. 
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performance or the use of accounting in this opaque industry. Some evidence demonstrates that 
managerial incentives related to fundraising for subsequent funds lead to the manipulation of 
reported private equity NAVs (e.g., Barber and Yasuda 2017; Brown, Gredil, and Kaplan 2017). 
At the same time, higher quality legal and accounting systems may constrain overvaluation 
(Cumming and Walz 2009).  
 Two studies address fair value accounting standards and private equity returns. Welch 
and Stubben (2018) find increased co-movement between reported private equity returns and 
market returns following the implementation of IAS 39 in an international setting while Brown et 
al. (2017) report a decrease in return autocorrelation for venture funds following ASC 820. A 
working paper by Jenkinson, Landsman, Rountree, and Soonawalla (2016) provides some 
evidence on the reliability of reported NAVs as predictors of future net distributions, but does 
not address fair value accounting requirements. More recently, Crain and Law (2017) explore the 
valuations of private companies held by private equity funds before and after fair value 
accounting rule changes. Our analysis differs insomuch as we explore the effect of ASC 820 on 
fund-level valuations (NAVs) that are provided by private equity funds and the future cash flows, 
net of fees, to and from the limited partners of the fund. This level of analysis is most relevant to 
the limited partners because they are ultimately interested in, and incorporate into their own 
financial statements, the performance of the fund as a whole rather than the valuation of the 
companies held by the funds. 
 Using over 13 years of quarterly NAVs, cash contributions, and cash distributions for 
private equity funds from Preqin’s Private Equity Cash Flow Download, we form a sample of 
liquidated private equity funds where we can observe cash calls (contributions) and distributions 
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over the lifetime of the fund.8 First, we investigate changes to NAV estimates that are not 
explained by distributions from or contributions to the fund (what we call valuation adjustments) 
in the period surrounding ASC 820 adoption. We find that, following ASC 820 adoption, private 
equity funds make more frequent upward valuation adjustments to their quarterly reported 
NAVs.  
 Second, we investigate the mapping between the reported NAV for the fund and the 
present value of net ex post distributions/contributions to/from limited partners. Our primary 
discount rate is the internal rate of return (IRR) ultimately realized by the fund from inception to 
liquidation, and our results are robust to using several other discount rates. In other words, we 
compare the fund’s quarterly reported NAV with its net present value (NPV), i.e., the discounted 
net distributions to limited partners based on perfect foresight. Analogous to the studies of 
analysts’ forecasts of earnings (e.g., Fried and Givoly 1982), we calculate a measure of the 
accuracy (i.e., unsigned error) and bias (i.e., signed error) of the quarterly reported NAV of the 
fund based on the difference between the NAV and the NPV for the quarter of the report.  
 We find that private equity NAVs estimate future, realized net distributions with greater 
accuracy following ASC 820 implementation. We also find some cross-sectional evidence of a 
more significant increase in accuracy for venture funds, which appears to be driven by a decrease 
in bias for these funds following ASC 820. Within the private equity industry, ASC 820 received 
the most criticism from venture capitalists as venture investments represent the most illiquid and 
difficult to value private equity investments.9 Our results suggest that ASC 820 improved the 
information environment even more for these funds.   
                                                 
8 Preqin’s Private Equity Cash Flow Download provides fund-level information at the limited partner level, but not 
about the portfolio companies invested in by the private equity fund.  
9 See, for example, https://venturebeat.com/2009/01/15/why-fas-157-is-stupid/, 
https://www.sigalow.com/2011/01/26/tis-the-season-for-valuations/ 
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 We acknowledge the difficulty in testing for the effects of a change in accounting 
standards that happened almost concurrently with the 2008 financial crisis. Thus, we buttress our 
findings with controls for concurrent market moves, a difference-in-difference analysis, and a 
battery of robustness checks.  
 Our results inform private equity investors, limited partner stakeholders, industry 
practitioners, and policy makers as to the effectiveness of the enhanced guidance in ASC 820 in 
a significant segment of the financial markets. We contribute to the growing literature on private 
equity as well as to the literature exploring the use of fair value measurement in financial 
reporting.  
 We contribute to the private equity literature by examining a change in the accounting for 
its most important performance indicator, NAV, across a wide variety of fund styles (i.e., buyout, 
venture, real estate, and more). While Brown et al. (2017) find that venture funds' NAVs 
experience decreased autocorrelation after FAS 157, our findings suggest that the decreased 
autocorrelation results in venture funds reporting more accurate and less biased NAVs so that 
fund-level NAVs more closely reflect future cash flows. Whereas Crain and Law (2017) provide 
evidence that fair value accounting increased the valuations of the private companies in which 
buyout funds invest, our evidence reflects changes in private equity NAV accuracy at the fund-
level, which is the level most pertinent to private equity investors (i.e., limited partners). We also 
study a more complete set of private equity funds that includes venture funds, for which ASC 
820 may have been more difficult to implement. 
 We also contribute to the literature on fair valuation as we provide evidence on the 
usefulness of accounting information (i.e., the NAV) as an estimate of future net distributions 
under previous and new GAAP guidance. Importantly, recent literature on fair value 
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measurement generally explores variation across the fair value hierarchy provided by ASC 820 
(i.e., comparison of Level 1 vs. Level 2 vs. Level 3). Our analyses are within the Level 3 
valuation category. Our results may shed light on the effect of fair value accounting standards on 
the measurement of similar Level 3 type assets held by other entities outside the private equity 
industry.  
 Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background regarding private equity, 
fair value, and ASC 820 and develops our research questions. In Section 3, we describe our 
sample and variable definitions. Section 4 provides descriptive statistics and presents our 
empirical tests. We discuss robustness tests in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6. 
 
2.  PRIVATE EQUITY, FAIR VALUE, AND ASC 820 
Private equity investment continues to grow in the U.S. and globally. Private equity 
represents an investment strategy characterized by purchasing the equity and, sometimes, the 
debt of private firms (see Kaplan and Strömberg 2009 for an overview). The structure of the 
industry is as follows. The general partner creates and manages one or more private equity funds 
while the limited partners represent the fund’s investors. In the typical fund life cycle, the 
general partner (GP) begins fundraising for a new fund and the limited partners (LPs) invest by 
committing a specified amount of capital. When investing in a fund, the limited partner enters 
into a contractual commitment entitled the Limited Partner Agreement (LPA), which outlines the 
limited partner’s monetary commitment, general partner compensation, and fund reporting 
requirements. As investment opportunities in portfolio companies arise, the general partner calls 
invested capital from limited partners and the fund subsequently invests in those portfolio 
companies. Finally, the fund returns capital and profit, less a general partner management fee 
8 
  
and carried interest10, to the limited partners as the fund matures and divests of its portfolio 
companies. It is unusual for a private equity fund to hold onto cash following such divestitures. 
The LPA typically calls for return of capital and profit over a ten-year fund life but fund-life 
extensions are possible. 
Throughout the life of the fund, the general partner submits reports to the limited partners 
of the fund, usually on a quarterly basis. These reports typically provide timely information on 
exited investments and realized returns, as well as on those investments still in the portfolio, any 
unrealized returns, and the valuation techniques used.11 At the same time, private equity 
valuation poses challenges due to its unlisted, illiquid, and non-transparent nature. For example, 
in an interview with a large private equity investor, we learned that it is not uncommon for two 
different private equity funds invested in the same underlying asset to use different valuations for 
that same asset. In addition, interim valuations may facilitate future fundraising, and future funds 
comprise a significant portion of long-run GP compensation, both in terms of management fees 
and carried interest (Chung, Sensoy, Stern, and Weisbach 2012; Brown et al. 2017). Recently, 
The Wall Street Journal and New York Times reported that the SEC’s Enforcement Division has 
sent informal inquires to several private equity firms to gather information regarding their 
valuation techniques and how they report performance.12 Given the controversy and recent 
                                                 
10 General partner compensation often follows the industry standard of 2/20 (2 percent management fee on all 
invested capital and 20 percent “carried interest” of the total return, typically after a hurdle rate is reached). 
Gompers and Lerner (1999) discuss compensation in the private equity industry. 
11 While we can observe financial statements for the subset of public private equity general partners (e.g., KKR), 
they are generally unavailable for private funds which make up the vast majority of the industry. A portfolio 
summary from InterWest is available at http://www.interwest.com/sites/default/files/PEI-Investor-Relations-
Manual-LP-Reporting-Chapter.pdf; this is also included in Private Equity International’s Investor Relations Manual 
as an example of how private equity funds should report their performance to their limited partners (Holmes and 
Hupp 2011). Having said that, we would argue that the published reports of a public, private equity GP, either pre- 
or post-820, would not reflect the same type of reporting as received by LPs in a specific private equity fund. 
12 See Lattman (2012), Morgenson (2014), and Maremont and Spector (2014), as well as SEC speeches by Bowden 
(2014), Wyatt (2015), and Deresney (2016). 
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lawsuits surrounding financial reporting transparency (EY 2016), this study seeks to provide 
insight into the reporting of private equity performance. 
Most private equity funds qualify as investment companies under the Investment 
Companies Act of 1940 and therefore must apply Investment Company accounting under ASC 
946 (see Holmes and Hupp 2011). Investment Company accounting requires that investments in 
underlying portfolio companies be reported at fair value. While ASC 820 provided additional 
guidance for how to determine fair value, the use of fair value in the private equity industry dates 
back to the 1970s when pension funds began to invest in private equity. Pension fund reporting 
required the use of fair value accounting for investments; thus, pension funds often included a 
GAAP (and thus, fair value) reporting requirement in the LPA. The AICPA Audit and 
Accounting Guide for Investment Companies, as well as various standards implemented by 
industry trade groups, provided guidance on the use of fair value in reporting of investments. In 
2003, the Private Equity Industry Guidelines Group (PEIGG) issued U.S. Private Equity 
Valuation Guidelines which helped shape industry practice. These guidelines focused on 
estimating fair value using an entry price. In practice, private equity funds usually valued 
portfolio company investments at cost or at the price of the latest round of financing, which 
provided a new estimate of the value of the investment. This previous practice differs from ASC 
820, which requires fair values to be based on an exit price.13 Implemented in 2008, ASC 820 
clarified the definition and measurement of fair values in an attempt to obtain consistent 
estimation of fair values. Importantly, the new standard focuses on a market-based approach 
which may prove problematic in valuing private equity investments, which are generally highly 
                                                 
13 In addition, the PEIGG guidelines called for interim asset-write-ups, even in the absence of a subsequent 
financing round. While the PEIGG guidelines, issued in 2003, were the industry standard, adoption was voluntary. 
Only 21% of general partners surveyed had formally adopted the 2003 PEIGG guidelines by 2005 (Blaydon and 
Wainwright 2005). 
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illiquid with non-transparent market prices (which leads to Level 3 estimates under the ASC 820 
fair value hierarchy). 
Fair value allows general partners to monitor their investments, make asset allocation 
decisions, and provide timely information to their limited partners.14 Limited partners may, in 
turn, monitor and compare fund performance, make asset allocation decisions, and report 
quarterly performance information to their own investors (i.e., stakeholders in the pension, 
endowment, fund of funds, etc.)15 Yet, there is little evidence on the effect of accounting 
standards, including those related to fair values, on this asset class, although several studies 
investigate the performance and risk of private equity funds (see, for example, Kaplan and 
Schoar 2005; Phalippou and Gottschalg 2009; Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan 2014; Jegadeesh, 
Kräussl, and Pollet 2015). An exception is Welch and Stubben (2018), who analyze the market 
co-movement of the returns on European private equity funds before and after the adoption of 
IAS 39; the authors conclude that fair value reporting requirements increased return co-
movement with the public markets. In addition, Brown et al. (2017) include a test of whether 
private equity return autocorrelation changed following the adoption of SFAS 157 (now ASC 
820); they find a decrease for venture funds but not for buyout funds. Crain and Law (2017) 
evaluate the effect of fair value accounting on the valuations reported by the private companies 
in which buyout funds invest, while Ferreira, Kräussl, Landsman, Nykyforovych, and Pope 
                                                 
14 In an opaque setting without mandatory disclosure and limited regulation, such as in private equity, financial 
reporting may become even more important. In a similar private setting, Cassar and Gerakos (2010) find that hedge 
funds voluntarily invest in internal controls over financial reporting to reduce agency costs. Moreover, hedge fund 
investors are willing to pay higher fees for internal controls in settings where managers have more discretion in 
reporting or manipulating performance. Even in private lending relationships between banks and small companies, 
financial reporting plays a role in a monitoring capacity (Minnis and Sutherland 2016).  
15 We understand that LPs have access to information from the fund GPs above and beyond that contained in the 
quarterly report. That said, LPs largely rely on and use the GP-provided NAV estimates in their own financial 
reports. To verify this, we checked through the financial reports of the four largest public investors in private equity 
– CPPIB, WSIB, CalPERS, and Teacher Retirement System of Texas – and we found that all of them use the NAV 
provided by the private equity fund’s GP. For example, CPPIB states that the primary valuation technique used for 
private equity fund investments is the NAV provided by the investment manager. WSIB bases fair value of 
individual private equity investments on the valuations reported by GPs. 
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(2018) provide evidence on the reliability and relevance of private equity funds’ fair values 
estimates for their investee companies. Several studies suggest that managerial incentives may 
lead to the manipulation of reported NAVs (Barber and Yasuda 2017; Brown et al. 2017; 
Jenkinson, Sousa, and Stucke 2013) while a cross-country study by Cumming and Walsh (2009) 
finds more stringent accounting standards and stronger legal systems reduce overvaluation in 
private equity reporting. 
A number of accounting studies investigate the effect of ASC 820 on the measurement 
and use of fair values in financial reporting. Several studies compare the value relevance of fair 
value measurements across different underlying asset types (e.g., Kolev 2009; Song et al. 2010; 
Goh, Li, Ng, and Yong 2015; Lawrence et al. 2016). Song et al. (2010) find that the value 
relevance of fair values increase along the fair value hierarchy, from Level 1 to Level 2 to Level 
3. The authors argue that while fair values may be relevant, investors assign differential 
weighting to fair values based on their measurement inputs, suggesting potential differences in 
the perceived reliability of those fair values. Similarly, Riedl and Serafeim (2011) find greater 
information risk associated with Level 3 assets than with Level 1 and 2 assets. On the other hand, 
Lawrence et al. (2016) find that, in a sample of closed-end funds, Level 3 fair values are of 
similar value relevance to Level 1 and Level 2 fair values. In a mortgage servicing setting, 
Altamuro and Zhang (2013) find that valuations based on Level 3 inputs are more positively 
related to the persistence of future cash flows than are valuations based on Level 2 inputs. 
Collectively, these findings suggest that fair value estimates provide relevant information16; 
however, the results may vary across settings, measurement inputs, and assets.  
                                                 
16 These findings contrast with earlier empirical work by Petroni and Wahlen (1995) who do not find the pricing of 
investment securities such as corporate bonds to be value relevant. Later, Carroll et al. (2003) conclude that the 
Petroni and Wahlen (1995) findings are most likely due to correlated omitted variables. 
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At the same time, fair value estimates are susceptible to managerial opportunism. Early 
work by Beaver and Venkatachalam (2003) suggest that managerial discretion can affect the 
reliability of bank loan fair values. As Cotter and Richardson (2002) discuss, insiders have 
greater expertise related to valuing firm-specific assets. Laux and Leuz (2009) point out that, 
while managers may use discretion in estimating fair values, managers’ litigation concerns could 
rein in managerial fair value estimates. It is uncertain whether litigation concerns apply to the 
opaque private equity setting, but at the same time, reputation and fundraising efforts may 
dominate private equity managerial behavior. However, aside from a test related to return 
autocorrelation in the appendix of Brown et al. (2017), we are unaware of any other study that 
explores the effect of ASC 820 on private equity funds.  
We focus on two main research questions regarding private equity net asset valuation and 
the implementation of ASC 820.  
First, we focus on liquidated private equity funds for which we can observe the full set of 
contributions to and distributions from the fund, in order to investigate the ability of private 
equity NAVs to predict future net distributions before and after ASC 820. On the one hand, fair 
value accounting could improve the relevance and reliability of private equity reporting. On the 
other hand, private equity investments are difficult to value making fair value accounting 
difficult to implement. Our first research question follows: 
 
RQ1: Do private equity net asset valuations equally predict future net distributions to 
limited partners before and after the implementation of ASC 820? 
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Our second research question considers the characteristics of funds where we expect ASC 
820 to potentially have a differing effect. In particular, we examine cross-sectional variation 
across fund manager experience, fund size, and fund type.  
We first consider fund manager experience. It is possible that ASC 820 implementation 
differentially affected managers based on their level of experience. Prior literature suggests that 
private equity managers are more likely to “game” returns when the fund manager has less 
experience (Barber and Yasuda 2017). Second, we look for differences depending on fund size. 
Larger funds might have better systems in place to estimate the value of their underlying 
investments so that smaller funds may benefit more from the implementation of ASC 820. 
Third, we consider fund strategy. For example, buyout funds generally invest in mature 
firms that, in turn, may have been easier to value, even before ASC 820, because they have an 
established pattern of cash flow generation and are more likely to have publicly-traded 
comparables. As another fund strategy, venture funds invest in early stage companies – often 
without cash generation – many of which fail and operate in less transparent reporting 
environments. (See Metrick and Yasuda 2010). These difficult-to-value portfolio companies 
often undergo numerous rounds of financing and receive investments from a number of private 
equity firms. As a result, interim valuation often relies on a new financing round whereas, in 
quarters without subsequent financing, the venture fund may carry the investment at cost until a 
subsequent round is undertaken. In this scenario, ASC 820 may have a potentially stronger effect 
through enhancing the guidance around interim valuation. On the other hand, many contended 
that venture investments are inherently too difficult to reliably fair value and argued ASC 820 
would have little or no effect on these funds.17 
Our second research question follows: 
                                                 
17 See Mendelson (2009) and Sigalow (2011). 
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RQ2: Did ASC 820 implementation differentially affect private equity net asset 
valuations based on fund and fund manager characteristics? 
 
3. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
3.1 Sample Description 
To test for differences in reported net asset valuations before, during, and after the 
implementation of ASC 820 in 2008, we focus on the years 2002 through 2014. In most of our 
tests, we exclude the years 2007 and 2008 from our analysis as they overlap not only with the 
implementation of ASC 820 but also with the global financial crisis, which likely affected 
private equity valuations.18  
The Preqin Private Equity Cash Flow Download is the primary data source for our 
sample and has been used in other academic studies including Ewen, Jones, and Rhodes-Kropf 
(2013) and Ang, Chen, Goetzmann, and Phalippou (2018). Private equity fund NAVs, 
contributions, and distributions (all net of fees) as well as fund size, fund manager, and fund type 
are obtained by Preqin from public investors in private equity via the Freedom of Information 
Act.19 Data in the cash flow download are scaled by Preqin to be representative of a $10 million 
commitment to the fund. As of September 2017, when we obtained the Preqin download, 
116,995 fund quarters from 3,492 private equity funds from 1985 to June of 2017 were available 
on Preqin. For each fund, we obtain from Preqin the amount of capital committed, the fund 
strategy, the general partners or firm with which the fund is affiliated, fund size, cash calls and 
distributions by date, and NAVs by quarter. We require a U.S. fund focus, because funds with 
Europe or Rest of World focus may be less likely to follow U.S. GAAP. Our main tests explore 
                                                 
18 ASC 820 allowed early adoption in 2007 and required adoption in 2008. 
19 Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan (2014) obtain similar performance results using the Burgiss, Cambridge Associates, 
and Preqin data sets; they conclude that these three private equity data sources are unbiased. 
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the predictive power of NAVs and adjustments to NAVs; therefore, we require a non-zero NAV 
at the end of the current and lagged fund-quarter. Following Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) 
and Brown et al. (2017), we examine NAVs for the first ten years of the private equity fund’s 
life.20 Finally, in order to assess private equity fund NAVs as predictors of future distributions 
and contributions, we limit our sample to liquidated funds, as defined by Preqin. The sample of 
liquidated private equity fund-quarters from 2002 to 2014 represents 9,162 fund-quarters from 
432 funds.21 Panel A of Table 1 outlines our sample selection procedures. 
 
3.2 Net Asset Valuations (NAVs) 
Given that Preqin’s private equity data is relatively new to the accounting literature, we 
provide below a simple description of private equity funds’ reported net asset valuations. At any 
given point in a fund’s life, the fund’s NAV represents the sum of its cash contributions, or calls, 
to date less any distributions of realized returns to date, plus accounting recognition of estimated 
unrealized returns made on investments within the fund, net of fees. 
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(1) 
In Equation (1), NAVQ is the quarterly net asset value reported by the private equity fund at 
quarter Q; Contributionsq represents the limited partners’ contributions into the fund during 
quarter q, Distributionsq are distributions from the fund to its limited partners during quarter q, 
                                                 
20 When we extend the sample to include all fund-quarters from the first 15 years of the fund’s life, our main 
inferences are unchanged. 
21 We use all fund cash inflows and outflows during the fund’s life (whether that precedes 2002 or extends to 2016) 
in order to both observe the fund’s ex post internal rate of return and calculate NPV as of a given fund-quarter. 
While most of our analysis uses a 2002 to 2014 sample period, we use a sample that also includes 1996, 1997, 1998, 
and 1999 to conduct a difference-in-difference analysis of the effect of ASC 820. 
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Valuation adjustmentq is the change in NAV from quarter q-1 to quarter q, that is not explained 
by contributions, distributions, and fees during the quarter, and Feesq are the fees charged by the 
general partner. Funds usually do not hold onto cash and thus distribute any realized returns 
almost immediately; therefore, the valuation adjustment should largely represent unrealized 
returns. Under conservative accounting, Valuation adjustmentq will represent only those returns 
that have been realized through an explicit valuation change (e.g., through the sale of assets) but 
have not yet been distributed. Under fair value accounting, however, Valuation adjustmentq will 
represent both undistributed, realized returns as well as the recognition of some or all unrealized 
returns in the form of changed (fair) value of ongoing investments.  
 
3.3 Calculation of Net Present Value (NPV) of Future Cash Flows 
Our first research question considers the ability of private equity fund reported NAVs to 
predict future discounted cash distributions and contributions. We compute the NPV of future 
distributions to investors less future contributions from investors, discounted by an assumed 
discount rate (r), as in the following equation: 
 
ܰܲ ௤ܸ ൌ෍ܦ݅ݏݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݅݋݊ݏ௤ା௜ െ ܥ݋݊ݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݅݋݊ݏ௤ା௜ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ௤ା௜
்
௜ୀଵ
 (2) 
 
where q is the current quarter, i indexes future quarters, and T is the date of liquidation of the 
fund. The relation in equation (2) is the well-known, net present value model, in which current 
value is equal to the sum of the present values of all future cash flows. The relation differs from 
more typical applications of the net present value model that require estimation of terminal 
values for a lengthy, sometimes infinite, stream of future cash flows. Private equity funds with 
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their short lifespans (typically 14 years, with a standard deviation of 3.7 years in our dataset) 
allow for observation of all future net distributions through to the end of the life of the fund.  
For each fund, we first use the relation in equation (2) to calculate the internal rate of 
return over the entire life of the fund (which we refer to as END_IRR). That is, we solve for the 
rate of return that yields a NPV of zero as of time zero, which is the date of the initial investment 
in the fund. 22 Then, for each quarter q following the initial investment in the fund, we use the 
fund’s END_IRR as the discount rate to determine the net present value of future distributions 
and contributions from that quarter q until the end of the life of the fund, T. Thus, we obtain a 
fund-specific, perfect-foresight, net present value (NPV) at each quarter-end in the life of the 
fund.  
 
3.4 NAV Bias and Accuracy 
The reported NAV reflects the private equity fund managers’ assessment of the value of 
the expected future distributions and contributions and, as such, it is a forecast of these 
distributions and contributions. Thus, the difference between our NPV calculation and NAV is a 
measure of the accuracy of the forecast just as the difference between any forecast (such as an 
earnings forecast) and the realized amount is an indicator of forecast accuracy.  
We define NAV Biasiq as fund i’s quarter q reported NAV less our NPV calculation for 
the quarter, scaled by NAV. Thus, NAV Bias is increasing in the optimism in the NAV of the 
fund relative to the net present value of ex post realized net distributions. NAV Accuracyiq is the 
                                                 
22 The internal rate of return implied by these sequences of cash flows, the sign of which changes over time (i.e., in 
some years there are net cash inflows and in others there are net cash outflows) may not be unique. In order to check 
the sensitivity of our results to this issue, we calculate the internal rate of return using starting points (“seeds”) in the 
iterative procedure implicit in the internal rate of return ranging from 1 percent to 20 percent. In 24 funds (or 4.5% 
of the 432 liquidated funds in our sample), we find estimates of the implied IRR that differ by more than 1%, 
depending upon the seed. Including or excluding these observations from our analyses has no noticeable effect on 
our empirical results and no effect at all on our inferences. 
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absolute value of NAV Biasiq, and is multiplied by -1 so that the variable is increasing in 
accuracy relative to the perfect foresight NPV. These variable definitions are similar to those 
used in the analyst forecast setting; for example, in Fried and Givoly (1982), accuracy is the 
absolute value of forecasted EPS less actual EPS, scaled by the absolute value of actual EPS.23 
While bias in private equity NAVs relative to ex post future distributions is assessed in 
Jenkinson et al. (2016), we are unaware of any study of the accuracy of private equity fund 
managers' reported NAVs. In addition, the accuracy of private equity fund NAVs has not been 
explored in the context of ASC 820. 
 
4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND EMPIRICAL TESTS 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1, Panel B shows the composition of the types of funds in our sample. The funds in 
our sample represent a broad range of styles, with 34.3 percent of funds labeled as Buyouts and 
21.5 percent as Venture. The remaining style categories include Real Estate (12.0 percent of 
funds), Early Stage (6.9 percent of funds), and such other categories as Distressed Debt, Growth, 
Mezzanine, and Natural Resources.  
Panel C of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample of 432 liquidated funds 
and 9,162 fund-quarters from 2002 to 2014. While the mean (median) fund in our sample raises 
$560 ($306) million of committed capital, there is a wide range of funds with an un-tabulated 
minimum (maximum) size of $13 ($6,114) million. The mean and median total fund life is 
approximately 14 years. As Figure 1 shows, cash contributions are generally largest in the early 
years of a fund’s life, while cash distributions generally tend to be more normally distributed. 
                                                 
23 In un-tabulated results, we obtain similar inferences in our main tests (in Table 4) when we scale by the absolute 
value of NPV rather than by the absolute value of NAV. 
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The mean (median) liquidated fund in our sample returns 170 percent (139 percent) of its 
investors’ total cash contributions over the life of the fund.  
The mean (median) values of Contributions and Distributions are 0.046 (0.000) and -
0.076 (0.000), respectively. S&P500Return, which we use to proxy for the broader market 
quarterly return, has a mean (median) value of 0.010 (0.016) across all fund-quarters in our 
sample. Mean (median) END_IRR is 0.140 (0.094) for the sample of liquidated funds and the 
mean (median) values of NAV Accuracy and NAV Bias are -0.843 (-0.360) and -0.201 (0.057), 
respectively. Given the obvious skewness in these data, our regression analyses are based on 
median and robust regressions and we will focus on the median regressions for most of our 
inferences. 
 
4.2 Analysis of Private Equity Fund NAV Adjustments 
 Before proceeding to the examination of our main research questions, we provide, in 
Table 2, a descriptive analysis of the valuation adjustments before and after the implementation of 
ASC 820. Column 1 reports that 96.4 percent of fund-quarters include a non-zero valuation 
adjustment in the sample of all 9,162 fund-quarters and this percentage changes little, increasing 
from 96.2 percent in the pre-2007 period (i.e., prior to ASC 820) to 96.6 percent in the post-2008 
period.  
 For the overall sample of fund-quarters that do include valuation adjustments, 51.9 
percent of adjustments are positive (see column 2 of Table 2). The percentage of positive 
valuation adjustments increases from 50.3 percent in the pre-2007 period to 57.7 percent in the 
post-2008 period, following ASC 820. These changes in the likelihood of a positive valuation 
adjustment could be attributable to one of two sources. ASC 820 may have resulted in a change 
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in reporting behavior. Alternatively, the post-period predominately presents a time of rising 
market prices following the global financial crisis. Therefore, these results could be attributable 
to NAV’s incorporating concurrent market returns associated with this rise (which we control for 
in subsequent tests). Columns 3 and 4 (5 and 6) assess the size of positive (negative) valuation 
adjustments. While positive valuation adjustments tend to be smaller in the post-period (based on 
medians), columns 5 and 6 suggest the size of negative valuation adjustments becomes larger. 
Overall, these results suggest that private equity funds make more frequent but smaller upward 
valuation adjustments in the period following ASC 820 implementation, which suggests that 
private equity funds provide more timely information to their limited partners in the post-820 
period. 
 
4.3 Univariate Analysis of Private Equity Fund NAV Bias and Accuracy 
Recall that our focus on liquidated private equity funds allows us to observe all 
distributions to and contributions from LP investors through to the end of the fund’s life and to 
assess reported NAVs as predictors of future distributions and contributions. Table 3 presents 
mean and median NAV Bias and NAV Accuracy in the periods pre-2007 and post-2008. From 
2002 to 2006 (the pre-period) to 2009 to 2014 (the post-period) following ASC 820 adoption, we 
observe a significant increase in overall median accuracy from the pre-period to the post-period. 
The change in bias from the pre-to the post-period is not significantly different from zero. Of 
course, accuracy and bias may be affected by factors other than the adoption of ASC 820. We 
control for these factors in our regression analyses, which follow.  
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4.4 Regression Analyses of NAV Accuracy and Bias 
We investigate the accuracy (unsigned error) and bias (signed error) of private equity 
NAVs as estimates of the NPV of net distributions through to the end of the fund’s life, using the 
following regressions: 
 
ܰܣܸ	ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௜௤ ൌ ߙଵܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙଶܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ 
൅ߙଷܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙସܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ 
൅ߙହܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙ଺ܳ4	 ൅ ߙ଻ܳ4	 ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 
൅෍ܨݑ݊݀	ܽ݃݁ ൅ ߳௜௤ 
(3a) 
 
 
ܰܣܸ	ܤ݅ܽݏ௜௤ ൌ ߙଵܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙଶܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ 
൅ߙଷܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙସܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ 
൅ߙହܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙ଺ܳ4	 ൅ ߙ଻ܳ4	 ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 
൅෍ܨݑ݊݀	ܽ݃݁ ൅ ߳௜௤ 
(3b) 
 
We include all observations for years 2002 to 2006 and 2009 to 2014. The variable Post 
is an indicator variable equal to one for the years 2009 to 2014, which are the years after the 
implementation of ASC 820, zero otherwise. Like Kaplan and Schoar (2005) we include the 
lagged and contemporaneous quarterly returns on the S&P 500 index to control for the effects of 
market conditions on accuracy and bias. Like Jenkinson et al. (2013), we include a fourth-quarter 
indicator variable, Q4, that equals one if the quarter is the fourth quarter of the fiscal year, zero 
otherwise. This variable is included to capture the possible effect of the annual audit in the fourth 
quarter on the accuracy and bias of reported NAV. We include fixed effects for fund age, which 
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is the number of years since the initiation of the fund to control for changes in accuracy and bias 
with fund age. In a robustness check, we use number of years to liquidation instead of fund age. 
If the accuracy in private equity funds’ NAVs relative to future distributions improved 
following the implementation of ASC 820, we would expect a positive α1 coefficient in Equation 
(3a). Similarly, if the bias in private equity funds’ NAVs relative to future distributions changed 
following the implementation of ASC 820, we would expect a significant α1 coefficient in 
Equation (3b).  
Table 4 presents the results of estimating Equation (3a) in Panel A and Equation (3b) in 
Panel B. Given the skewness in the dependent variables, we conduct median and robust 
regressions, following Gipper, Leuz, and Maffett (2016) and Leone, Minutti-Meza, and Wasley 
(2017). Standard errors are clustered by fund for all regressions.  
We find evidence of an improvement in accuracy in the years 2009 to 2014 relative to the 
years 2002 to 2006. In Panel A, in both the median and robust regressions, the estimate of the 
coefficient on Post is positive and significant (0.133 with a t-statistic of 4.26 and 0.084 with a t-
statistic of 7.14), suggesting that NAV accuracy increased following ASC 820 implementation. 
Accuracy is significantly higher in the fourth quarter consistent with the annual audit in the 
quarter (the estimate of the coefficient on Q4 is 0.049 with a t-statistic of 2.49). Interestingly, this 
higher fourth-quarter accuracy is not observed after the implementation of ASC 820. (The 
estimate of the coefficient on Q4 * Post is -0.039 – i.e., the change in the accuracy in Q4 
following ASC 820 implementation is 0.049 – 0.039 = 0.010, which is not significantly different 
from zero).  
The results from the estimation of regression (3b) are reported in Panel B of Table 4. 
Although the estimate of the coefficient on Post is not significantly different from zero, the 
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estimate of the coefficient on Q4 is significant (0.050 with a t-statistic of 2.87) suggesting higher 
bias in that quarter prior to the implementation of ASC 820, consistent with private equity funds 
writing up valuations during the annual audit. But, this bias is not observed after the 
implementation of ASC 820; the estimate of the coefficient on Q4 * Post is -0.040 with a t-
statistic of -2.05 (i.e., the bias in the fourth quarter after the implementation is 0.050 – 0.040 = 
0.010, which is not significantly different from zero). These results appear consistent with the 
Table 2 finding that funds make smaller, more frequent positive valuation adjustments post-ASC 
820 and thus have a decreased need for upward adjustments at the year-end audit. 
 
4.5 Cross-sectional Analyses of NAV Accuracy and Bias 
 
We next proceed to analysis of cross-sectional differences in the effect of ASC 820 
implementation on private equity fund NAVs. To do so, we add each of Small Fund, More 
Experience, and Venture (both alone and interacted with Post) to Equations (3a) and (3b), as in 
the following regressions:  
 
ܰܣܸ	ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௜௤ ൌ ߙଵܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙଶ݈݈ܵ݉ܽ	ܨݑ݊݀௜ ൅ ߙଷ݈݈ܵ݉ܽ	ܨݑ݊݀௜௤ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 
൅	ߙସܯ݋ݎ݁	ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜௤ ൅ ߙହܯ݋ݎ݁	ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜௤ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 
൅ߙ଺ܸ݁݊ݐݑݎ݁௜ ൅ ߙ଼ܸ݁݊ݐݑݎ݁௜ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙଽܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ 
൅ߙଵ଴ܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ	 ൅ ߙଵଵܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ 
൅ߙଵଶܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙଵଷܳ4	ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎ  
൅ߙଵସܳ4	ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎ ∗ 	ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅∑ܨݑ݊݀	ܽ݃݁ ൅ ߳௜௤ 
(4a) 
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ܰܣܸ	ܤ݅ܽݏ௜௤ ൌ ߙଵܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙଶ݈݈ܵ݉ܽ	ܨݑ݊݀௜ ൅ ߙଷ݈݈ܵ݉ܽ	ܨݑ݊݀௜௤ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 
൅	ߙସܯ݋ݎ݁	ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜௤ ൅ ߙହܯ݋ݎ݁	ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜௤ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 
൅ߙ଺ܸ݁݊ݐݑݎ݁௜ ൅ ߙ଼ܸ݁݊ݐݑݎ݁௜ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙଽܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ 
൅ߙଵ଴ܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ	 ൅ ߙଵଵܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ 
൅ߙଵଶܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙଵଷܳ4	ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎ  
൅ߙଵସܳ4	ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎ ∗ 	ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅∑ܨݑ݊݀	ܽ݃݁ ൅ ߳௜௤ 
(4b) 
 
The variable Small Fund is an indicator variable that equals 1 for funds with below-
median fund size, zero otherwise. The variable More Experience is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 for a fund manager with more than one private equity fund, zero otherwise. The variable 
Venture equals 1 for venture funds, zero otherwise (and thus includes funds that invest following 
strategies such as buyout, real estate, and distressed debt). We report the results of estimation of 
Equation (4a) in Panel A of Table 5 and Equation (4b) in Panel B of Table 5. We report the 
results of estimation of median regressions in Column 1, and robust regressions in Column 2.  
The significantly positive estimate of the coefficient on Post, which we observed when 
fund types were not separated in the regression, is now observed only for the estimation based on 
the robust regression (coefficient estimate of 0.038 with a t-statistic of 2.14). Recall that the 
estimate of this coefficient in Table 4, when all fund types were not separated, was 0.084 with a 
t-statistic of 7.14. The evidence in Table 5 suggests that this increase in private equity NAV 
accuracy is primarily driven by venture funds (the estimate of the coefficient on Venture * Post 
is 0.104 with a t-statistic of 3.39).  
The striking result from the analysis of NAV bias (see Panel B), is that the bias for 
venture funds was significantly optimistic prior to the implementation of ASC 820 (coefficient 
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estimate of 0.581 with a t-statistic of 7.55) and this bias significantly decreased (by 0.376 with a 
t-statistic of -2.59) after the implementation.  
 
4.6 Difference-in-difference Analyses of NAV Accuracy and Bias 
 Our main analyses show that there was an increase in accuracy of NAVs following ASC 
820, a decrease in bias for venture funds, and a decrease in the Q4 bias that was observed prior to 
the implementation of ASC 820. In these analyses, we compared a pre-820 period, 2002 to 2006, 
with a post-820 period, 2009 to 2014, excluding the two years, 2007 and 2008, which were the 
years of the adoption of ASC 820 and the global financial crisis. In addition to excluding the 
years of the crisis, we also include controls to attempt to address the possible effects of changes 
in market conditions. However, there is a possibility that the crisis itself had lingering effects 
beyond 2008. To address this concern, we recognize the fact that 2000 and 2001 were years 
when there were major disruptions to the market in the form of the collapse of the internet 
bubble. This similar disruption provides a “control” set of observations for which we examine 
changes in accuracy pre- (i.e., 1996 through 1999) and post- (i.e., 2002 through mid-2004) the 
internet bubble effect. This “control” sample is compared in a difference-in-difference analysis 
with an ASC 820 “treatment” sample pre- (mid-2004 to 2006) and post- (2009 to 2014) ASC 820 
and the global financial crisis via the following regressions:24  
  
                                                 
24 We include the years 2009 to 2014 in the post / treatment group in attempt to balance the number of observations 
in this group with other groups. In un-tabulated analysis, we limit the post / treatment group to the years 2009 and 
2010 and obtain similar inferences, albeit with weaker statistical significance – possibly due to a loss of power. 
26 
  
ܰܣܸ	ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௜௤	 ൌ ߙଵܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൅ ߙଶܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙଷܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 
൅ߙସܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ ൅ ߙହܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 
൅ߙ଺ܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ ൅ ߙ଻ܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 
	൅ߙ଼ܳ4	 ൅ ߙଽܳ4	 ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙଽܳ4	 ∗ ܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ 
൅ߙଽܳ4	 ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ∗ ܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൅෍ܨݑ݊݀	ܽ݃݁ ൅ ߳௜௤ 
(5a) 
 
ܰܣܸ	ܤ݅ܽݏ௜௤	 ൌ ߙଵܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൅ ߙଶܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙଷܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 
൅ߙସܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ ൅ ߙହܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 
൅ߙ଺ܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ ൅ ߙ଻ܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 
	൅ߙ଼ܳ4	 ൅ ߙଽܳ4	 ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙଽܳ4	 ∗ ܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ 
൅ߙଽܳ4	 ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ∗ ܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൅෍ܨݑ݊݀	ܽ݃݁ ൅ ߳௜௤ 
(5b) 
 
In Equations (5a) and (5b), Treatment is set to zero for the years 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2002, 
and 2003, as well as Q1 and Q2 of 2004, and to 1 for the periods of Q3 and Q4 of 2004 plus 
2005, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. (In other words, we split the 2002 through 
2006 period into two.) Post is set to 1 for the periods 2002, 2003, Q1 and Q2 of 2004, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, zero otherwise. We are interested in the estimate of the 
coefficient on Treatment * Post, which captures the effect of implementation of ASC 820 after 
controlling for the effects of a major market disruption. 
 Table 6 presents the results of estimating Equations (5a) and (5b). Results are consistent 
with our earlier analysis of NAV accuracy, with evidence of an increase in NAV accuracy 
following ASC 820. In particular, in Panel A of Table 6, the estimate of the coefficient on 
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Treatment * Post is positive and significant in both specifications (coefficient estimates of 0.228 
and 0.160 with t-statistics of 4.75 and 8.07). Also, the observed fourth quarter higher accuracy in 
the pre-820 period is seen again (the estimate of the coefficient on Q4 * Treatment is 0.069 with 
a t-statistic of 2.53) and this higher difference in fourth-quarter accuracy is significantly reduced 
post-820 implementation (the estimate of the coefficient on Q4 * Treatment * Post is -0.108 with 
a t-statistic of -2.86).  
The results from the estimation of regression (5b), reported in Panel B of Table 6, lead to 
conclusions that are quite similar to those from the estimation of regression (3b). Again the 
estimate of the coefficient on Treatment * Post is not significantly different from zero. The Q4 
increase of 0.050 in bias prior to the implementation of ASC 820 and the decrease of 0.040 after 
the implementation is also observed in the Table 6, Panel B difference-in difference analysis. To 
see this note that the estimate of the coefficient on Q4 (which is for the “control” sample) is 
0.100 and the estimate of the coefficient on Q4 * Treatment is -0.051 implying that the estimate 
of the coefficient on Q4 for the “treatment” (i.e., ASC 820) sample is 0.100 – 0.051 = 0.049, 
which is remarkably similar to 0.050. Similar the estimate of the Q4 coefficient on the 
“treatment” sample post 820 implementation is -0.091 + 0.058 = -0.041, which is remarkably 
similar to -0.040.   
  
5. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 A challenge in testing for the effects of ASC 820 is that the change in accounting 
standard happened almost concurrently with the financial crisis. In this section we describe the 
un-tabulated controls and sensitivity tests we have implemented to help understand the 
robustness of our findings.  
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 Our main results exclude the years 2007 and 2008, when the credit crisis took effect. 
When we exclude the years 2007 and 2008, as well as 2009, from our sample, we obtain similar 
results in Tables 4, 5, and 6. When we include observations from 2007 in the pre- period and 
from 2008 in the post-period, we find that our main results in Tables 4, 5, and 6 are similar and 
in some cases stronger.  
 Our net present value (NPV) calculations are based on using the END_IRR for each fund, 
i.e., the fund’s internal rate of return from inception to liquidation, in order to discount future net 
distributions to limited partners as of a given quarter. For robustness, we assess the sensitivity of 
our tests by using a variety of discount rates to calculate NPVs, the choice of which is guided by 
the observed distribution of END_IRR for our sample of liquidated funds. As shown in Table 1, 
Panel C, END_IRR has a mean (median) of 14.0 (9.4) percent and a 25th percentile (75th 
percentile) of 0.0 (19.4) percent. We thus re-calculate NPVs for all fund-quarters using discount 
rates of 0.0, 9.6, 14.0, and 19.4 percent, as well as the 11.0 percent rate assumed in Jenkinson et 
al. (2016). In these analyses, we find the following: similar results in Table 4; consistent results 
for the effect of ASC 820 on venture capital funds in Table 5; and, similar results for the 
difference-in-difference tests for all assumed discount rates except 19.4 percent in Table 6. 
Our main results use the S&P 500 index to represent broader market returns, as in Kaplan 
and Schoar (2005). When we also control for the Russell 2000 and Cambridge Private Equity 
index returns (in both the current and lagged quarter), results are similar with the following 
exceptions: in the robust regression for the main analysis (column (2) of Panel A in Table 4), the 
coefficient on Post is no longer significantly different from zero, and in the robust regression for 
the difference-in-difference analysis (column (2) of Panel B in Table 6), the coefficient on 
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Treatment * Post is positive and significantly different from zero (p < 0.05). All inferences based 
on the median regressions are unchanged when we add these additional indices.  
In our main tests, we attempt to control for differences in fund age by including fund-age 
fixed effects. We attempt several other robustness checks and obtained similar results. First, we 
estimate modified versions of Equations (3a) and (3b) in which we interact each firm-age fixed 
effect with Post. In the accuracy tests using median regression, we continue to find evidence of 
an increase in accuracy in the post-ASC 820 period across most years of fund age. Second, while 
our main tests include fund-age fixed effects, based on the fund’s age since inception, we also 
estimated the tests in Tables 4 through 6 including a time-to-liquidation fixed effect, based on the 
time remaining in the fund’s life (obviously an ex post analysis), as well as including both fund-
age and time-to-liquidation fixed effects. In these analyses, we obtained similar results. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This study evaluates the effect of ASC 820 on valuations reported by U.S. private equity 
funds and, in particular, the effect of how fair value is implemented by private equity funds 
before and after ASC 820. This setting involves highly illiquid underlying investments that are 
inherently difficult to value, as well as perfect-foresight observation of all cash flows over a 
fund’s lifetime, which negates the need for terminal value estimates. Given that private equity 
funds’ reported NAVs are typically incorporated into the financial statements of the fund’s 
investors, this change to the most important accounting standard for the private equity industry 
potentially affects a large cross-section of the capital markets. 
We show that, following ASC 820 adoption, private equity fund NAVs predict ex post 
future net distributions to fund investors more accurately following ASC 820 implementation 
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and venture funds experience a decrease in bias. Moreover, the improvement in NAV accuracy 
following ASC 820 appears to stem from more frequent upward adjustments to private equity 
fund NAVs following ASC 820 adoption. Our results suggest that enhanced fair value reporting 
requirements may have improved the information environment for private equity investors and 
their stakeholders. 
Our study thus departs from fair value literature that requires market prices to evaluate 
the underlying relevance and/or reliability of fair value estimates (as discussed by Sloan 1999), 
and allows us to shed light on the financial reporting of an opaque segment of the financial 
markets. While we address some of the benefits of additional fair value guidance under ASC 
820, we do not attempt to address the potential increase in costs due to the new valuation 
guidelines. 
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APPENDIX 
Variable Definitions 
 
 
 Variable  Definition 
   
Contributionsiq = The dollar value of calls received by fund i during quarter q, 
according to Preqin 
Distributionsiq = The dollar value of distributions paid by fund i during quarter q, 
according to Preqin, multiplied by -1 
END_IRRi = The internal rate of return realized by a liquidated fund over its 
entire life 
Feesq = The fees charged to the private equity fund by the general partner 
Fund Sizeiq = The total commitments to a private equity fund, measured in 
millions of dollars, according to Preqin, where commitments are 
the specified sum of capital a limited partner has agreed to 
contribute to a private equity fund 
More Experience = Indicator variable that equals 1 for a fund manager with more 
than one private equity fund and equals 0 otherwise 
NAViq = Net asset value reported by fund i at the end of the quarter q, 
according to Preqin 
NAV Accuracyiq = The absolute value of NAV Biasiq, multiplied by -1 so that this 
variable is increasing in accuracy 
NAV Biasiq = NAViq – NPViq, scaled by NAViq 
NPViq = Future quarterly net distributions (distributions less contributions) 
to limited partners from quarter q+1 to fund liquidation, 
discounted at the internal rate of return ultimately realized by the 
fund (END_IRRi) 
Post = Indicator variable that equals 1 for the years following 2008 and 
zero for the years preceding 2007 
Q4 = Indicator variable that equals 1 during the fourth calendar quarter 
and equals 0 otherwise 
Small Fund = Indicator variable that equals 1for a fund with below median fund 
size, and equals 0 otherwise 
S&P500Returnq = The CRSP quarterly return on the S&P500 index (SPRTRN), 
compounded monthly during quarter q 
Valuation adjustmentiq = The change in NAV from quarter q-1 to quarter q, that is not 
explained by contributions and distributions during the quarter 
Venture = Indicator variable that equals 1 for a venture fund and equals 0 
otherwise 
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FIGURE 1 
 
  
 
Note: This graph represents data from the full sample of liquidated funds with fund-age <= 10 for 
years 2002 to 2014. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table contains details regarding sample selection (in Panel A), the breakdown of funds by 
investment strategy (in Panel B); and descriptive statistics for the sample of funds (in Panel C). 
Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
Fund 
Quarters 
Unique 
Funds 
Unique 
Firms 
Unique  
Years 
Unique 
Vintage 
Years 
Initial Preqin Sample 116,995 3,492 1,396 35 38 
Require US fund focus 94,950 2,665 1,035 35 38 
Require NAV>0 80,063 2,650 1,035 35 35 
Require lag NAV 74,167 2,565 1,003 35 33 
Require non-missing fund size 72,113 2,475 981 35 33 
Limit sample to 2002 to 2014 51,519 2,104 889 13 30 
Funds with fund-age <= 10, 2002 to 2014 42,826 2,061 874 13 23 
Liquidated funds with fund-age <= 10, 2002 to 2014 9,162 432 275 13 22 
 
Panel B: Breakdown of funds by investment strategy 
 Unique Funds 
Investment Strategy # % 
Balanced 9 2.1 
Buyout 148 34.3 
Direct Lending 1 0.2 
Distressed Debt 16 3.7 
Early Stage 30 6.9 
Early Stage: Start-up 1 0.2 
Expansion / Late Stage 14 3.2 
Fund of Funds 2 0.5 
Growth 12 2.8 
Infrastructure 4 0.9 
Mezzanine 26 6.0 
Natural Resources 12 2.8 
Real Estate 52 12.0 
Secondaries 7 1.6 
Timber 2 0.5 
Turnaround 1 0.2 
Venture (General) 93 21.5 
Venture Debt 2 0.5 
Total 432 100 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for funds and fund-quarters 
N Mean Std Dev P5 Q1 Median Q3 P95 
Funds     
Fund Size ($ million) 432 560 796 55 150 306 598 2,000 
Total Fund Life (in Years) 432 13.8 3.7 7 12 14 16 19 
Total Contributions 432 9,866,089 1,172,351 8,167,150 9,700,001 10,000,000 10,001,594 11,389,880 
Total Distributions 432 16,812,534 19,469,057 2,334,836 8,968,825 13,415,200 18,847,713 37,560,001 
Total Distributions/Total Contributions 432 1.702 1.952 0.254 0.906 1.390 1.887 3.756 
END_IRR 432 0.140 0.392 -0.195 -0.000 0.094 0.194 0.570 
Fund-quarters     
NAViq 9,162 3,976,612 2,833,086 313,020 1,795,330 3,487,275 5,632,430 9,277,540 
Net Present Value (NPViq) 9,162 3,669,011 3,555,159 -53,310 861,984 2,865,460 5,919,787 10,208,748 
NAV Accuracyiq 9,162 -0.843 17.833 -1.757 -0.708 -0.360 -0.146 -0.024 
NAV Biasiq 9,162 -0.201 17.852 -1.139 -0.252 0.057 0.477 1.036 
Valuation adjustmentiq/NAViq-1 9,162 0.176 10.788 -0.217 -0.034 0.000 0.048 0.268 
∆NAViq/NAViq-1 9,162 0.146 10.790 -0.388 -0.094 -0.007 0.042 0.342 
Contributionsiq/NAViq-1 9,162 0.046 0.359 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.228 
Distributionsiq/NAViq-1 9,162 -0.076 0.272 -0.393 -0.065 0.000 0.000 0.000 
S&P500Returnq 9,162 0.010 0.082 -0.142 -0.026 0.016 0.058 0.149 
Q4q 9,162 0.219 0.413 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
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TABLE 2 
Valuation Adjustments of Liquidated Private Equity Funds 
 
This table explores the valuation adjustments made by liquidated private equity funds in the 
fund-quarters before, after, and spanning implementation of ASC 820 (SFAS 157). Panel A 
presents the frequency of fund-quarters that include a non-zero valuation adjustment (Column 1), 
the frequency of fund-quarters with non-zero valuation adjustments that include positive 
valuation adjustments (Column 2), and the size of valuation adjustments (Valuation adjustment) 
scaled by lagged NAV (Columns 3 through 6), in the years 2002 through 2014. Panel B presents 
the same statistics for the periods before and after ASC 820 (2002 to 2006 and 2009 to 2014, 
respectively), as well as tests of the difference between these two periods. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All variables 
are defined in the Appendix.  
 
Panel A: Valuation adjustments by year 
 
Year 
 
N 
 Valuation 
adjustment ≠ 0 
Valuation 
adjustment > 0 
Valuation adjustment 
(>0) 
Valuation adjustment 
(<0) 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     Mean Median Mean Median 
2002 941  925 (98.3%) 309 (33.4%) 0.071 0.031 -0.104 -0.062 
2003 1,000  966 (96.6%) 444 (46.0%) 2.382 0.047 -0.066 -0.033 
2004 1,153  1,106 (95.9%) 590 (53.3%) 0.132 0.062 -0.073 -0.033 
2005 1,102  1,049 (95.2%) 584 (55.7%) 0.155 0.059 -0.066 -0.034 
2006 1,017  967 (95.1%) 593 (61.3%) 0.156 0.059 -0.071 -0.024 
2007 954  935 (98.0%) 552 (59.0%) 0.637 0.050 -0.078 -0.031 
2008 815  782 (96.0%) 296 (37.9%) 0.493 0.036 -0.138 -0.066 
2009 692  669 (96.7%) 315 (47.1%) 0.152 0.046 -0.125 -0.049 
2010 501  482 (96.2%) 294 (61.0%) 0.113 0.053 -0.072 -0.032 
2011 345  332 (96.2%) 209 (63.0%) 0.096 0.047 -0.075 -0.031 
2012 277  266 (96.0%) 162 (60.9%) 0.063 0.036 -0.117 -0.050 
2013 206  200 (97.1%) 131 (65.5%) 0.320 0.033 -0.077 -0.039 
2014 159  157 (98.7%) 104 (66.2%) 0.075 0.038 -0.161 -0.035 
2002-2014 9,162  8,836 (96.4%) 4,583 (51.9%) 0.436 0.048 -0.090 -0.040 
         
Panel B: Valuation adjustments before and after ASC 820 
 
Year 
 
N 
 Valuation 
adjustment ≠ 0 
Valuation 
adjustment > 0 
Valuation adjustment 
(>0) 
Valuation adjustment 
(<0) 
2002-2006 5,213  5,013 (96.2%) 2,520 (50.3%) 0.532 0.053 -0.078 -0.036 
2009-2014 2,180  2,106 (96.6%) 1,215 (57.7%) 0.132 0.041 -0.104 -0.042 
2002-2006  
vs. 2009-2014   ***  *** *** ** 
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TABLE 3 
Accuracy and Bias of Liquidated Private Equity NAV Disclosures 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics regarding the accuracy and bias of liquidated private 
equity fund NAV disclosures relative to future net distributions discounted back at the internal 
rate of return ultimately realized by the fund from inception to liquidation (END_IRR) for the 
periods before and after ASC 820 (2002 to 2006 and 2009 to 2014, respectively), as well as tests 
of the difference between these two periods. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. 
 
 
Years 
  
N 
Mean  
Accuracy 
Median 
Accuracy 
Mean  
Bias 
Median  
Bias 
2002-2006  5,213 -0.959 -0.392 -0.318 0.004 
2009-2014  2,180 -0.693 -0.271 -0.195 0.025 
2002-2006  
vs. 2009-2014   *** 
  
  
41 
 
TABLE 4 
Accuracy and Bias of Liquidated Private Equity NAV Disclosures 
 
This table assesses the accuracy and bias of liquidated private equity fund NAV disclosures 
relative to the net present value of future net distributions discounted back at the internal rate of 
return ultimately realized by the fund from inception to liquidation (END_IRR). The variable 
Post equals zero for the firm quarters prior to 2007, and one for the firm-quarters after 2008. We 
estimate the following equations for the years 2002 to 2014 but excluding 2007 and 2008:  
 
ܰܣܸ	ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௜௤ ൌ ߙଵܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙଶܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ ൅ ߙଷܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 
൅ߙସܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ ൅ ߙହܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙ଺ܳ4	 ൅ ߙ଻ܳ4	 ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 
൅෍ܨݑ݊݀	ܽ݃݁ ൅ ߳௜௤ 
 
 
ܰܣܸ	ܤ݅ܽݏ௜௤ ൌ ߙଵܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙଶܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ ൅ ߙଷܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 
൅ߙସܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ ൅ ߙହܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙ଺ܳ4	 ൅ ߙ଻ܳ4	 ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 
൅෍ܨݑ݊݀	ܽ݃݁ ൅ ߳௜௤ 
 
Panels A and B respectively present results for NAV accuracy and NAV bias. Column (1) uses 
median regression and Column (2) uses robust regression. All 11 fund age fixed effects are 
included (for years 0 through 10 of fund age) and thus intercepts are suppressed. Coefficients are 
presented with standard errors in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by fund. ***, **, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
 
Panel A: NAV accuracy 
  Median 
(1) 
   Robust 
(2) 
  
 Coefficient  T-stat.  Coefficient  T-stat.  
Post 0.133 *** 4.26  0.084 *** 7.14  
S&P500Returnq -0.076  -0.68  -0.065  -0.76  
S&P500Returnq * Post 0.121  0.99  0.040  0.33  
S&P500Returnq-1 -0.077  -0.93  -0.103  -1.33  
S&P500Returnq-1 * Post 0.177 * 1.68  0.179 * 1.71  
Q4 0.049 ** 2.49  0.042 *** 2.89  
Q4 * Post -0.039  -1.62  -0.025  -1.02  
         
Fixed Effects?  Fund age    Fund age   
Observations  7,393    7,393   
Number of funds  432    432   
R-squared      0.200   
Pseudo R-squared  0.009       
 
 
Panel B: NAV bias 
  Median 
(1) 
   Robust 
(2) 
  
 Coefficient  T-stat.  Coefficient  T-stat.  
Post 0.022  0.59  0.003  0.14  
S&P500Returnq -0.207 * -1.83  -0.487 *** -3.58  
S&P500Returnq * Post 0.034  0.26  0.276  1.39  
S&P500Returnq-1 0.055  0.62  0.064  0.52  
S&P500Returnq-1 * Post -0.159  -1.26  -0.184  -1.09  
Q4 0.050 *** 2.87  0.066 *** 2.87  
Q4 * Post -0.040 ** -2.05  -0.054  -1.39  
         
Fixed Effects?  Fund age    Fund age   
Observations  7,393    7,393   
Number of funds  432    432   
R-squared      0.004   
Pseudo R-squared  0.004       
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TABLE 5 
Cross-sectional Analysis of Accuracy and Bias of Liquidated Private Equity NAV 
Disclosures 
 
This table assesses the accuracy and bias of liquidated private equity fund NAV disclosures 
relative to future net distributions discounted back at the internal rate of return ultimately 
realized by the fund from inception to liquidation (END_IRR). The variable Post equals zero for 
the firm quarters prior to 2007, and one for the firm-quarters after 2008. We estimate versions of 
the following equations for the years 2002 to 2014 but excluding 2007 and 2008:  
 
ܰܣܸ	ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௜௤ ൌ ߙଵܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙଶ݈݈ܵ݉ܽ	ܨݑ݊݀௜ ൅ ߙଷ݈݈ܵ݉ܽ	ܨݑ݊݀௜௤ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ  
൅	ߙସܯ݋ݎ݁	ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜௤ ൅ ߙହܯ݋ݎ݁	ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜௤ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 
൅ߙ଺ܸ݁݊ݐݑݎ݁௜ ൅ ߙ଻ܸ݁݊ݐݑݎ݁௜ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ߙ଼ܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ ൅ ߙଽܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ	 
൅ߙଵ଴ܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ ൅ ߙଵଵܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙଵଶܳ4 ൅ߙଵଷܳ4 ∗ 	ܲ݋ݏݐ 
൅∑ܨݑ݊݀	ܽ݃݁ ൅ ߳௜௤ 
 
 
ܰܣܸ	ܤ݅ܽݏ௜௤ ൌ ߙଵܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙଶ݈݈ܵ݉ܽ	ܨݑ݊݀௜ ൅ ߙଷ݈݈ܵ݉ܽ	ܨݑ݊݀௜௤ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ  
൅	ߙସܯ݋ݎ݁	ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜௤ ൅ ߙହܯ݋ݎ݁	ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜௤ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 
൅ߙ଺ܸ݁݊ݐݑݎ݁௜ ൅ ߙ଻ܸ݁݊ݐݑݎ݁௜ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ߙ଼ܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ ൅ ߙଽܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ	 
൅ߙଵ଴ܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ ൅ ߙଵଵܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙଵଶܳ4 ൅ߙଵଷܳ4 ∗ 	ܲ݋ݏݐ 
൅∑ܨݑ݊݀	ܽ݃݁ ൅ ߳௜௤ 
 
Panels A and B respectively present results for NAV accuracy and NAV bias. Column (1) uses 
median regression and column (2) uses robust regression. All 11 fund age fixed effects are 
included (for years 0 through 10 of fund age) and thus intercepts are suppressed. Coefficients are 
presented with standard errors in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by fund. ***, **, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
 
Panel A: NAV accuracy 
  Median 
(1) 
   Robust 
(2) 
  
 Coefficient  T-stat.  Coefficient  T-stat.  
Post 0.071  1.61  0.038 ** 2.14  
Small Fund -0.156 *** -3.78  -0.143 *** -13.40  
Small Fund * Post -0.031  -0.45  -0.017  -0.87  
More Experience 0.020  0.52  0.006  0.61  
More Experience * Post -0.058  -0.98  -0.034 * -1.82  
Venture -0.235 *** -4.40  -0.184 *** -14.97  
Venture * Post 0.128  1.48  0.104 *** 3.39  
S&P500Returnq 0.032  0.33  -0.095  -1.18  
S&P500Returnq * Post 0.042  0.37  0.090  0.77  
S&P500Returnq-1 -0.029  -0.38  -0.120 * -1.65  
S&P500Returnq-1 * Post 0.170  1.60  0.182 * 1.83  
Q4 0.008  0.55  0.029 ** 2.16  
Q4 * Post 0.005  0.25  -0.011  -0.49  
         
Fixed Effects?  Fund age    Fund age   
Observations  7,393    7,393   
Number of funds  432    432   
R-squared      0.217   
Pseudo R-squared  0.032       
 
 
Panel B: NAV bias 
  Median 
(1) 
   Robust 
(2) 
  
 Coefficient  T-stat.  Coefficient  T-stat.  
Post 0.081  1.54  0.092 *** 3.31  
Small Fund -0.008  -0.14  0.020  1.23  
Small Fund * Post 0.025  0.30  0.073 *** 2.38  
More Experience -0.044  -0.85  -0.034 ** -2.19  
More Experience * Post 0.015  0.22  0.006  0.22  
Venture 0.581 *** 7.55  0.491 *** 25.67  
Venture * Post -0.376 *** -2.59  -0.397 *** -8.33  
S&P500Returnq -0.296 *** -2.97  -0.448 *** -3.56  
S&P500Returnq * Post 0.136  1.08  0.227  1.24  
S&P500Returnq-1 0.195 ** 2.16  0.096  0.84  
S&P500Returnq-1 * Post -0.272 ** -2.27  -0.198  -1.28  
Q4 0.077 *** 4.24  0.083 *** 3.92  
Q4 * Post -0.068 *** -3.16  -0.072 ** -2.02  
         
Fixed Effects?  Fund age    Fund age   
Observations  7,393    7,393   
Number of funds  432    432   
R-squared      0.030   
Pseudo R-squared  0.031       
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TABLE 6 
Diff-in-Diff Analysis of Accuracy and Bias of Liquidated Private Equity NAV Disclosures 
 
This table assesses the accuracy and bias of liquidated private equity fund NAV disclosures 
relative to future net distributions discounted back at the internal rate of return ultimately 
realized by the fund from inception to liquidation (END_IRR). We estimate versions of the 
following equations:  
 
ܰܣܸ	ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௜௤ 	ൌ ߙଵܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൅ ߙଶܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙଷܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ߙସܨݑ݊݀	ܵ݅ݖ݁௜ 
൅ߙହ	ܨݑ݊݀	ܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙ଺ܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ ൅ ߙ଻ܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 
൅ߙ଼ܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ ൅ ߙଽܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 	൅ߙଵ଴ܳ4	 ൅ ߙଵଵܳ4	 ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 
൅ߙଵଵܳ4	 ∗ ܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൅ ߙଵଵܳ4	 ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ∗ ܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൅෍ܨݑ݊݀	ܽ݃݁ ൅ ߳௜௤ 
 
ܰܣܸ	ܤ݅ܽݏ௜௤ 	ൌ ߙଵܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൅ ߙଶܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙଷܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ߙସܨݑ݊݀	ܵ݅ݖ݁௜ 
൅ߙହ	ܨݑ݊݀	ܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߙ଺ܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ ൅ ߙ଻ܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 
൅ߙ଼ܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ ൅ ߙଽܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௤ିଵ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 	൅ߙଵ଴ܳ4	 ൅ ߙଵଵܳ4	 ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ 
൅ߙଵଵܳ4	 ∗ ܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൅ ߙଵଵܳ4	 ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ ∗ ܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൅෍ܨݑ݊݀	ܽ݃݁ ൅ ߳௜௤ 
 
The tests use a matched sample of funds from 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. The years 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2002, and 
2003 plus Q1 and Q2 of 2004 serve as the control group, and Q3 and Q4 of 2004 and the years 
2005, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 serve as the treatment group. Thus, 
Treatment = 1 for Q3 and Q4 of 2004 and the years 2005, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 
and 2014 and Treatment = 0 for the years 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2002, and 2003 plus Q1 and 
Q2 of 2004. Post = 1 for the years 2002 and 2003 plus Q1 and Q2 of 2004, and for the years 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014.  
 
Panels A and B respectively present results for NAV accuracy and NAV bias. Column (1) uses 
median regression and column (2) uses robust regression. All 11 fund age fixed effects are 
included (for years 0 through 10 of fund age) and thus intercepts are suppressed. Coefficients are 
presented with standard errors in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by fund. ***, **, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
 
Panel A: NAV accuracy 
  Median 
(1) 
   Robust 
(2) 
  
 Coefficient  T-stat.  Coefficient  T-stat.  
Treatment -0.063 * -1.66  -0.051 *** -3.31  
Post -0.117 *** -3.65  -0.090 *** -5.43  
Treatment * Post 0.228 *** 4.75  0.160 *** 8.07  
S&P500Returnq -0.060  -0.76  -0.022  -0.21  
S&P500Returnq * Post 0.036  0.37  -0.039  -0.31  
S&P500Returnq-1 -0.090  -1.03  -0.033  -0.30  
S&P500Returnq-1 * Post 0.143  1.50  0.047  0.38  
Q4 -0.018  -0.93  -0.006  -0.26  
Q4 * Post 0.071 *** 2.60  0.063 * 1.97  
Q4 * Treatment 0.069 ** 2.53  0.035  1.28  
Q4 * Treatment * Post -0.108 *** -2.86  -0.071 * -1.74  
         
Fixed Effects?  Fund age    Fund age   
Observations  9,566    9,566   
Number of funds  474    474   
R-squared      0.206   
Pseudo R-squared  0.011       
 
 
Panel B: NAV bias 
  Median 
(1) 
   Robust 
(2) 
  
 Coefficient  T-stat.  Coefficient  T-stat.  
Treatment -0.013  -0.31  -0.033  -1.36  
Post -0.041  -1.08  -0.016  -0.61  
Treatment * Post 0.051  0.93  0.035  1.12  
S&P500Returnq -0.092  -1.05  -0.095  -0.57  
S&P500Returnq * Post -0.126  -1.21  -0.227  -1.16  
S&P500Returnq-1 -0.017  -0.18  -0.067  -0.38  
S&P500Returnq-1 * Post -0.045  -0.41  -0.017  -0.09  
Q4 0.100 *** 4.41  0.103 *** 2.93  
Q4 * Post -0.091 ** -2.92  -0.110 ** -2.19  
Q4 * Treatment -0.051 * -1.74  -0.032  -0.76  
Q4 * Treatment * Post 0.058  1.52  0.054  0.86  
         
Fixed Effects?  Fund age    Fund age   
Observations  9,566    9,566   
Number of funds  474    474   
R-squared      0.005   
Pseudo R-squared  -0.201       
 
 
 
